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We describe the industrial project that a “proliferator” would conduct to produce a first,
small batch of nuclear weapons. From refining yellowcake ore to final weapons assem-
bly, we highlight the project’s tasks and their interactions. The proliferator can choose
alternative production technologies that offer quicker completion, but at higher cost
in terms of limited resources. The proliferator can also expedite his project by devot-
ing more resources to critical tasks. From physics and chemistry, we determine raw
material requirements. From industrial engineering and materials science, we convert
these requirements into estimates of the time, manpower, energy, and money required to
complete each task under normal and expedited conditions. Using generalized project-
management analysis tools, we then estimate the earliest possible completion time of
the project, assuming two different levels of resource availability. We also estimate the
time required to complete a weapon if some of the project’s steps can be skipped; for
example, if the proliferator acquires stolen, highly enriched uranium metal.
INTRODUCTION
This article documents the component tasks of a major industrial project that
a “proliferator” must complete, or may need to complete, to produce “a first nu-
clear weapon.” By this last phrase, we mean a first small batch of crude nuclear
weapons. We integrate details from physics, chemistry, industrial engineering,
and materials science to create a generalized critical-path network model of
the project.1 We also derive estimates of raw-material, manpower, energy, and
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time requirements for task completions under normal or expedited conditions.
With this information and the model, we then show how to estimate the earli-
est possible completion time for such a project given different assumed levels of
resources. An extended model in a follow-on article2 shows how one might delay
the project’s overall completion time by disrupting certain tasks through, for
example, embargoes on key materials. The current article should provide poli-
cymakers with a sound quantitative basis for devising technologically oriented
policies regarding nonproliferation.3
The details of the proliferator’s nuclear-weapons program depend on too
many factors to consider in a single article, so we make the following simplifying
assumptions in a case study: (a) The program is covert, (b) the proliferator
already produces yellowcake uranium for use in civilian reactors or for sale to
others, (c) he will pursue a simple fission weapon, and (d) he has signed the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
A nuclear-weapons program is complex, but the basics of nuclear-weapon
design are now well known and publicly available:4 The acquisition of weapons-
grade uranium or plutonium is the proliferator’s main hurdle to creating a nu-
clear weapon, not theoretical physics. But, (a) neither uranium nor plutonium
are available on the open market, (b) NPT inspections preclude the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel into weapons-grade plutonium, and (c) we shall initially
assume that stolen materials are unavailable. Consequently, the key to creating
a nuclear weapon covertly will be the proliferator’s development of an organic
manufacturing infrastructure for weapons-grade uranium and/or plutonium. A
plutonium-based weapon would require the covert construction of a nuclear re-
actor, and plutonium is difficult to handle, so it is reasonable to assume that the
proliferator would choose a simpler, uranium-based weapon. Yellowcake ura-
nium oxide, diverted from civilian use, will constitute the raw material. (For
context, see Spears5 who traces the lifecycle of nuclear materials from raw ore
to waste disposal.)
Yellowcake can be diverted from civilian use even if the proliferator does not
operate a nuclear fuel cycle. For example, controlling a uranium mine suffices
because yellowcake can be diverted from the ore-processing facilities near such
a mine. More than 30 countries have proven uranium reserves, and surely
others have uranium-ore deposits that have not been discovered, or at least not
reported. Uranium oxide can also be extracted from certain ores that are sold in
international commerce for their scandium, vanadium, or other metal content.
This offers another means to obtain yellowcake, or a substitute for it, without
operating a nuclear fuel cycle.
The proliferator will need to commit a great deal of material, manpower,
and technology to all parts of his nuclear-weapons project, from construct-
ing manufacturing infrastructure for uranium metal, to the acquisition of a
weapons-delivery method, for example ballistic missiles. Managing such a com-
plex and expensive project is difficult without some sort of project-management
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protocol, especially if the project is to remain covert. Since the late 1950s, gov-
ernments and industry have widely employed techniques of operations research
to the scheduling and coordination of complex projects. In particular, the basic
methods of the Program Evaluation Review Technique/Critical Path Method
(PERT/CPM) have been extended over the years to manage the complexities
that arise in real-world projects.6
Moder, Phillips, and Davis define a project as “a set of tasks or activities
related to the achievement of some planned objective, normally where the objec-
tive is unique or non-repetitive.”7 The proliferator’s program to develop a first
nuclear weapon fits this definition well. We can therefore reasonably expect
him to employ standard project-management tools such as Microsoft Project
to plan, organize, and schedule the project’s tasks efficiently.8 In any case, we
will use these tools to estimate the project’s completion time, and should the
proliferator choose to act suboptimally by not using such tools, the resulting es-
timate will be appropriately conservative for our purposes. That is, the project
will take longer to complete than we estimate.
Project-management models are universally represented as networks. In
the now-standard activity-on-node version of a project network, nodes represent
important (sub)tasks that must be completed to finish the project, whereas
arcs represent precedence relationships between tasks. In the basic model, a
task-i node is connected to a task- j node with a directed arc (i, j) if task i
must be completed before task j is begun. Each node i possesses a “length”
that represents task i’s nominal duration; arcs have zero length. The overall
duration of the project, from an artificial “start task” to an artificial “finish
task,” is the total length of the longest, directed path through the network, also
known as the critical path.
We must generalize the basic project model, as follows:
1. Completion of any task in a “normal” amount of time consumes a fixed
amount of one or more resources that are in limited supply.9 In particular, we
model consumption of energy, raw materials, and three types of manpower,
and through these, the consumption of money.
2. The duration of an individual task may be expedited, that is, shortened, by
allocation of additional quantities of required resources.10,11 We assume a
linear relationship between the amount of each additional resource provided
and the duration of the task: More resources accelerate progress. However,
each task requires some minimum amount of time to complete, below which
additional resources have no effect.
3. When one or more tasks are expedited to minimize project completion time,
the project has been “crashed.” Crashing is limited by resource availability,
including a monetary budget.
166 Harney et al.
Figure 1: An activity-on-node project network with one decision node. Tasks represented
by nodes 1 through 6, and 9 through 11, must be completed to complete the project. A
triangular node represents a “decision task”14: After Task 5 is complete, either Task 7 or Task
8 must be completed. Arcs represent precedence relationships.
4. Standard finish-to-start (FS) precedence relationships between pairs of
tasks are generalized to include start-to-start (SS), finish-to-finish (FF), or
start-to-finish (SF). Given this generality, it is easy to accommodate a lag-
or lead-time between pairs of tasks.12
5. Certain milestone events, most importantly the stockpiling of adequate sup-
plies of highly enriched uranium metal (HEU), can be achieved via alterna-
tive courses of action. When one such alternative is chosen, the tasks in the
other alternative(s) need not be completed. Alternative courses of action di-
verge at decision nodes;13 see Figure 1. In our case study, the decision node
chooses one of three uranium-enrichment technologies.
Within the limits of his resources, the proliferator wishes to minimize the
completion time of his weapons project, that is, crash the project, by expediting
“critical tasks” (i.e., tasks on the critical path), and tasks that become critical
as other task durations are reduced.
ASSUMPTIONS
Given the proliferator’s goal of completing a first weapon as soon as possible,
we assume he will pursue a gun-type fission weapon, the same design used in
the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945. That design is
simple but reliable: Little Boy was relatively crude, but its designers were so
confident that Hiroshima was its first full-scale test.15 The gun-type weapon
requires more HEU than the alternative, an implosion weapon, but the latter
design would require high-visibility, high-energy testing to ensure its reliability
and it seems likely that a covert proliferator would prefer to avoid such testing.
“The first nuclear weapon” will really be a small number of weapons, the
most that can be manufactured without undue risk of detection. We assume
a production of six weapons per year, which we estimate will require an an-
nual input of 300 kilograms (kg) of HEU. In turn, this will require the inputs
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estimated by the chemistry of Appendices A and B, which include about 120
metric tons of yellowcake each year.
The main tasks in the project are:
1. Covert diversion of 120 metric tons of yellowcake annually (this quantity
amounts to only one medium truckload per month, is likely to go undetected,
and is the key reason for assuming a production of at most six weapons per
year);
2. Production of enrichment-plant feed material (uranium hexafluoride, UF6)
from yellowcake;
3. Uranium enrichment, including the choice of method to employ;
4. Conversion of highly enriched UF6 to HEU metal; and
5. Design and construction of the actual weapons.
Appendix C displays the tasks included in our case study, and the Gantt
chart in Figure 2 shows a small part of a complete production plan from that
study.
We assess the requirements for specialized equipment from the chem-
ical processes described in Appendix A. The project network comprises
Figure 2: Gantt chart, from Microsoft Project, depicting 9 out of about 200 tasks in the
case-study project. (Created using Microsoft Project.) The solid horizontal bar for
“Acquisition of production components” indicates a summary task. (A “summary task” is a
feature of Microsoft Project, not a fundamental component of a standard project
network.) This summary task comprises two (sub)tasks, the acquisition of a “Vortex unit” and
of “Pumps and piping.” The “forward” hashing on their corresponding bars indicates that
they do not lie on the critical path. The task “Acquisition of plant site” is represented by
two adjacent bars. The first bars “backward” hashing indicates that this task is critical, and
its left and right endpoints represent the tasks planned, expedited start and completion
dates, respectively. The tasks planned duration of 12 weeks is displayed to the right of the
first bar. The second bars vertical hashing signals that the task has been expedited by an
amount proportional to the bars length, which also happens to be 12 weeks. (The nominal,
unexpedited duration of this task is 24 weeks.) The figure uses arrows to indicate
precedence relationships between tasks. For example, there is an “SS” (start-to-start)
relationship, including an 8-week lag, between “Design of production devices” and
“Design of enrichment cascade.”
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for 90% HEU kWh/SWU
Kilowatts for
60,000 SWU/Yr
Gaseous diffusion 1.0040–1.0045 3,500–4,000 2,500 17,120
Gas centrifuge 1.2–1.5 40–90 100–200 685–1,370
Aerodynamic 1.015–1.030 540–1100 3,600–4,000 24,660–27,400
Regardless of the technology used, producing HEU from natural uranium requires multiple
equipment stages arranged in a progressive enrichment cascade. The separation factor is
the ratio of the relative enrichment (U235 to U238) of the concentrated product to that of
the depleted tails in the output of any single stage of the cascade. The number of stages
required to produce HEU assumes the final tails contain less than 0.3% U235. “kWh per SWU”
measures the kilowatt-hours of energy required to produce approximately 5 grams of HEU.
The final column gives the average power consumption (rate) of an enrichment cascade
producing about 300 kg of HEU a year. Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA), 1993. “Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction,” OTA-BP-ISC-115,
U.S. Government Printing Office, December, p. 143.
approximately 200 tasks (nodes) and 600 precedence relationships (arcs). The
proliferator must manage five key resources in addition to money: energy, ma-
terials, professional labor (e.g., scientists and engineers), skilled labor (e.g.,
machinists), and unskilled labor.
If the proliferator chooses to expedite a given task, he must expend more
of each resource required for that task. The amount of resource r consumed,
given task duration T, is assumed to be br(1 + (ar − 1)(T¯ − T)/(T¯ − T)), where T¯
denotes the task’s nominal duration, T denotes its minimum duration, T must
satisfy T ≤ T ≤ T¯, br is the nominal consumption of that resource (i.e., when
the task’s duration is T¯), and ar is an “acceleration factor” that depends only on
the resource. See Appendix C for the values of T¯ and T used in the case study;
Table 2 lists the acceleration factors.
The proliferator can choose one of any number of enrichment technologies
to pursue: In our case study his options are gas centrifuges, gaseous diffusion,
or aerodynamic enrichment. Other enrichment technologies exist, but they are
expensive and/or technically demanding, and therefore seem unlikely options.16
However, any optional enrichment technique can be modeled with our methods.
Table 1 shows how to estimate the required number of enrichment machines








Each value is a multiplicative factor on total resource consumption for the fastest possible
completion time of any task. For example, if 10 professional laborers are needed to complete
a task its nominal time T¯ , then it would require 12 professional laborers (12 = 1.2 × 10) to
complete the task in the shortest possible time T .
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Table 3: National cost and availability of resources in our case study. The project
is further constrained by a budget of $190 million.
Name Units Unit cost ($/Unit) Units available
Energy MWhr 100 3,100,000
Materials $K 1,000 190,000
Professional labor Mmo 48,000 10,000
Skilled labor Mmo 24,000 10,000
Unskilled labor Mmo 6,000 6,000
MWhr = megawatt-hours. Mmo = man-months
and the energy consumption for each technology. A separative work unit (SWU)
measures the effort required to separate U235 and U238 isotopes during enrich-
ment. Production of 1 kg of HEU from natural uranium requires approximately
200 SWUs, and therefore anywhere from 570 to 23,000 kilowatts of power, de-
pending on the technology used.17 Appendix C lists case-study data, including
nominal costs.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Using the amounts of energy, materials, manpower, and labor listed in Table 3,
and a budget of $190 million, the proliferator uses aerodynamic enrichment to
complete his project in 338 weeks (six and a half years).
If all resource availability is doubled, including that for dollars, crashing
allows the proliferator to complete the project in 260 weeks (just under 5 years).
If we relax our initial assumption that stolen HEU is unavailable, and
suppose the proliferator obtains 300 kg of stolen HEU directly from a third
party, we have a scenario viewed by some as nearly equivalent to having a
deliverable weapon.18 Our model, appropriately modified and using nominal
resource levels, shows that the proliferator will still need 208 weeks (4 years)
to complete a first batch of 6 weapons. (With no organic source of HEU, that
may also be the only batch of weapons he will ever be able to produce.) If the
proliferator has access to unenriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and has also
developed a prototypic gas-centrifuge process (as Iran has), the model predicts
that he will remain committed to gas-centrifuge enrichment, and will need an
additional 216 weeks to complete his first weapon.
Even with 300 kg of HEU, the proliferator could be delayed in completing
his project by limiting access to certain manufacturing components. “Acquire
hafnia crucibles,” task 127, is not a critical task—we estimate 24 weeks of slack
here—but if we could delay this task in excess of 24 weeks, by any means, then
we could delay a finished weapon by that excess. Furthermore, an instance of
this task occurs in all alternative enrichment technologies, so the proliferator
cannot avoid this delay by switching technologies.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency19 has recently declared that more
than 40 countries do not fully comply with the NPT, and lists several nations
that are capable of, or are suspected of engaging in, nuclear-weapons devel-
opment. This article has shown how any one of them could proceed in this
development.
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APPENDIX A. URANIUM-ENRICHMENT CHEMISTRY
We study these chemical processes to deduce the facilities and equipment re-
quired to produce enriched uranium metal from yellowcake. The numbers be-
neath the chemical reaction formulas are molecular weights.
Source: For example, see M. Benedict, T. Pigford, and H. Levi, 1981. Nuclear
Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York), 129–160.
Feedstock Preparation (Yellowcake to Uranium Hexafluoride)
Stainless steel vessel (dissolution of yellowcake in nitric acid):
U3O8 + 6HNO3 → 3UO2(NO3)2 + 2H2O + H2
842 + 6 × 63 = 3 × 394 + 2 × 18 + 2
Stainless steel boiler (boil down of nitrate solution):
UO2(NO3)2 + 6H2O
boil−−−→ UO2(NO3)∗26H2O
394 + 6 × 18 = 502





300◦C−−−→ UO3 + 6H2O + 2NOx
502 = 286 + 6 × 18 + 108
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Gas-solid reactor vessel (reduction of uranium trioxide to uranium dioxide):
UO3 + H2
650◦–800◦C−−−−−−→ UO2 + H2O or 3UO3 + 2NH3
650◦–800◦C−−−−−−→ 3UO2 + N2 + 3H2O
286 + 2 = 270 + 18 or 3 × 286 + 2 × 17 = 3 × 270 + 28 + 3 × 18
Stainless steel reaction vessel (use hydrogen fluoride to convert uranium diox-
ide into uranium tetrafluoride):
UO2 + 4HF
300◦–500◦C−−−−−→ UF4 + 2H2O
270 + 4 × 20 = 314 + 2 × 18




314 + 38 = 352
Conversion of Uranium Hexafluoride to Uranium metal
Gas-phase reactor with particulate separation; uranium hexafluoride to
uranium fluoride solid:
UF6 + H2
375◦C−−−→ UF4 + 2HF
352 + 2 = 314 + 2 × 20
High-temperature metallurgical furnace; uranium fluoride to liquid uranium
to be cast into weapon components:
UF4 + 2Ca
low heat−−−→ U + 2CaF2 or UF4 + 2Mg
550◦–700◦C−−−−−−→ U + 2MgF2
314 + 2 × 40 = 238 + 2 × 78 or 314 + 2 × 24.3 = 238 + 2 × 62.3
APPENDIX B. CALCULATION OF RAW-MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
SIX GUN-TYPE FISSION WEAPONS
This appendix assesses the quantity of key raw materials required to produce
six fission weapons, each of which requires 50 kg of HEU. Theoretical require-
ments are computed from the chemical reactions and molecular weights spec-
ified in Appendix A. We show inputs needed to create one kilogram of each
intermediate material or one kilogram of the final HEU metal. The reader can
then easily compute the theoretical requirements to manufacture the full 300 kg
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of HEU. However, our final values multiply the theoretical requirements by 1.5
to account for imperfect conversions in real-world industrial processes.
Source: the authors.
1 kg of UNH(uranyl nitrate hexahydrate) requires 0.559 kg yellowcake and
0.251 kg HNO3
1 kg UO3 requires 1.755 kg of UNH
1 kg UO2 requires 1.059 kgUO3and 0.0074 kg H2
(hydrogen is ubiquitous, so we do not computed its final consumption)
1 kg UF4 requires 0.860 kg UO2and 0.255 kg HF
1 kg UF6 requires 0.892 kg UF4 and 0.108 kg F2
1 kg HEUF6 requires 232 kg UF6
1 kg HEUF4 requires 1.122 kg HEUF6 and 0.0064 kg H2
1 kg HEU metal requires 1.302 kg HEUF4, and 0.336 kg Ca or 0.204 kg Mg
Each weapon requires 50 kg 93% HEU metal, so six weapons require 300 kg
HEU metal.
Using the theoretical conversion listed earlier, and multiplying by 1.5 to






150 kg Ca or 90 kg Mg
These numbers are assumed when making the estimates in Appendix C.
APPENDIX C. TASKS INVOLVED IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
The data described here reflect standard engineering analyses, and are based
on one author’s experience in weapon-systems development and production.
However, we have made no attempt to obtain actual costs from vendors or to
extract detailed development-and-production data from specific programs; such
data would almost certainly be classified or proprietary. Consequently, individ-
ual cost estimates may be accurate only to within a factor of two, up or down.
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A bold task name indicates a summary task, which is feature of Microsoft
Project, not a standard component of a project network. (Note: For technical
reasons, summary tasks are split into “summary-task start” and “summary-
task finish.”) “Task” 28 is the decision node: Exactly one course of action must
be chosen at this point. A component name by itself, for example, “Stainless
steel boiler,” implies that the corresponding task is “acquire this component.”
Column 1 gives task identifier or “ID”; column 2 gives the task’s name; column 3
is a “Code” not used in this article; column 4 gives the nominal task duration in
weeks (wks); column 5 gives the minimum task duration if additional resources
are applied; column 6 gives the task’s direct predecessors, which must be com-
pleted before the task can commence (“FS,” “FF,” and “SS” denote finish-to-start,
finish-to-finish and start-to-start precedence relationships, respectively. Each
such relationship can have a lead (−) or lag (+), measured in weeks, associated
with it. For instance “7SS + 24” in row 9 indicates that task 8 cannot begin
until 24 weeks after task 7 begins); column 7 specifies the energy, in megawatt-
hours (MWhr), required to complete the task; column 8 specifies the millions of
dollars ($M) in materials required to complete the task; column 9 gives the man-
months (mm) of professional labor required to complete the project; columns 10
and 11 are similar, but for skilled labor and unskilled labor, respectively.











ID Name Code (wks) (wks) Predecessors (MWhr) ($M) (mm) (mm) (mm)
1s Nuclear Weapons Program [start] (tasks
2s–177 f )
— — — None — — — — —
2s Diversion of commercial yellowcake
[start] (tasks 3–5)
— 1s — — — — — — —
3 Design yellowcake plant modifications Fb 48 24 2s 2.4 0.01 6 6 —
4 Modify yellowcake plant Fc 48 24 3 — 0.1 6 6 12
5 Divert yellowcake Lc 120 60 4 — 45 48 48 —
2f Diversion of commercial yellowcake
[finish]
— — — 5 — — — — —
6s Produce enrichment plant feed material
[start] (uranium hexafluoride, UF6, tasks
7--10,25,26)
— — — 1s — — — — —
7 Design fluoridation plant (FP) Ib 80 40 6s 20 0.13 50 50 —
8 Acquire FP site Ca 24 12 7SS + 24 0.6 0.15 3 — —
9 Prepare FP site (internal modifications) Cc 24 12 8 6.6 0.07 3 15 15
6s Produce enrichment plant feed material
[finish]
— — — 1s
10s Acquire FP components [start] (tasks
11--24)
— — — 7SS + 12 — — — — —
11 Stainless steel mixing vessel Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.03 — 9 —
12 Distilled water system Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.03 — 9 —
13 Nitric acid storage tank Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.1 — 9 —
14 Stainless steel boiler Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.1 — 9 —
15 Thermal decomposition vessel Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.25 — 9 —
16 Drying kiln Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.05 — 9 —
17 Gas/solid high-temperature reaction
vessel
Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.5 — 9 —
18 Hydrogen gas (or ammonia) storage
tank
Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.01 — 9 —
19 Stainless steel reaction vessel Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.5 — 9 —
20 Hydrogen fluoride storage tank Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.2 — 9 —
21 Gas/solid ultrahigh temperature
reaction vessel
Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.5 — 9 —
22 Fluorine storage tank Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.15 — 9 —
23 Hexafluoride condensing vessel Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.1 — 9 —
24 Pumps and piping Ha 72 36 10s 1.8 0.1 — 9 —
10f Acquire FP components [finish] — — 11–24 — — — — —
25 Assemble and integrate FP Fb 48 24 9, 10FF + 12 27.6 — 18 30 90
26 Operate FP Lc 120 60 5SS + 0, 25 590 4.0 42 240 —
6f Produce enrichment plant feed material
[finish]
— — — 10f, 26 — — — —
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ID Name Code (wks) (wks) Predecessors (MWhr) ($M) (mm) (mm) (mm)
27s Enrich uranium [start] (some subset of
tasks 28--89)
— — — 1s — — — — —
28 Choose enrichment process (decision
node)
— 0 0 27s — — — — —
29s Gas centrifuge enrich-ment process (CP)
[start] (tasks 30--53)
— — — 28 — — — — —
30 Design basic GC Fb 48 24 29s 13.2 0.2 36 30 —
31s Acquire research components for CP
[start] (5 ea, tasks 32--37)
— — — 30SS + 12 — — — — —
32 Rotor tubes Fa 48 24 31 2.4 0.08 6 6 —
33 Air bearing systems Ea 40 20 31 1 0.08 — 5 —
34 Motors Ea 40 20 31 1 0.03 — 5 —
35 End caps Ca 24 12 31 0.6 0.03 — 3 —
36 Centrifuge cases Ca 24 12 31 0.6 0.05 — 3 —
37 Pumps and piping Ca 24 12 31 0.6 0.05 — 3 —
31f Acquire research components for CP
[finish]
— — — 32–37 — — — — —
38 Assemble research centrifuges Cb 24 12 29sSS, 31f 9.6 0.1 18 30 —
39 Test and evaluate research centrifuges Cb 24 12 38 9.6 0.1 18 30 —
40 Design production centrifuges Db 32 16 29sSS, 39FS−4 8.8 0.07 24 20 —
41 Design enrichment cascade Db 32 16 40SS + 8 12.8 0.07 24 40 —
42 Design enrichment plant (EP) Eb 40 20 41SS + 8 16 0.08 30 50 —
43 Acquire EP site Ca 24 12 42SS + 4 0.6 2.5 3 — —
44 Prepare EP site Cc 24 12 43 13.2 0.3 3 30 30
45s Acquire production CP components
[start] (1000 ea, tasks 46--51)
— — — 41SS + 8 — — — — —
46 Rotor tubes Ja 96 48 45s 4.8 4.8 12 12 —
47 Air bearing systems Ja 96 48 45s 2.4 1.6 — 12 —
48 Motors Ja 96 48 45s 2.4 1.6 — 12 —
49 End caps Ia 80 40 45s 2.4 1.6 — 12 —
50 Centrifuge cases Ia 80 40 45s 2.4 3.2 — 12 —
51 Pumps and piping Ia 80 40 45s 2.4 3.2 — 12 —
45f Acquire production CP components
[finish]
— — — 46–51 — — — — —
52 Assemble production centrifuges Fb 48 24 29sSS, 44, 45fFF + 8 315 — 42 1536 —
53 Integrate centrifuges Db 32 16 52SS + 8 44 — 20 200 —
54 Cascade loading Kb 112 56 26SS + 8, 52, 53 65 — 54 288 —
55 Produce enriched and depleted
material
Cc 24 12 54 45,000 — 54 432 —
29f Gas centrifuge enrichment process (CP)
[finish]
— — — 55, 45f, 44, 42, 41,
40,31f
— — — — —
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56s Gas-diffusion enrichment process (DP)
[start] (tasks 57--76)
— 0 0 28 — — — — —
57 Design basic DP system Fb 48 24 56s 13.2 0.2 36 30 —
58s Acquire research components for DP
[start] (5 ea, tasks 59--61)
— — — 57SS + 12 — — — — —
59 Diffusion barriers Fa 48 24 58s 2.4 0.05 6 6 —
60 Heat exchangers Ea 40 20 58s 1 0.03 — 5 —
61 Pumps and piping Ca 24 12 58s 0.6 0.07 — 3 —
58f Acquire research components for DP
[finish]
— — — 59–61 — — — — —
62 Assemble research devices Cb 24 12 58 f FF, 56s 9.6 0.1 18 30 —
63 Test and evaluate research devices Cb 24 12 62 9.6 0.1 18 30 —
64 Design production gas-diffusion
devices
Db 32 16 63FS–4 8.8 0.07 24 20 —
65 Design enrichment cascade Db 32 16 64SS + 8 12.8 0.07 24 40 —
66 Design enrichment plant (EP) Eb 40 20 65SS + 8 16 0.08 30 50 —
67 Acquire EP site Ca 24 12 66SS + 4 0.6 5 3 — —
68 Prepare EP site Cc 24 12 67 13.2 0.55 3 30 30
69s Acquire production components for DP
[start] (4000 ea, tasks 70--72)
— — — 65SS + 8 — — — — —
70 Diffusion barriers Fa 48 24 69 2.4 40 6 6 —
71 Heat exchangers Ea 40 20 69 1 20 — 5 —
72 Pumps and piping Ca 24 12 69 0.8 60 — 4 —
69f Acquire production components for DP
[finish]
— — — 70–72 — — — — —
73 Assemble production devices for DP Fb 48 24 68, 69fFF + 8 126 — 30 600 —
74 Integrate enrichment cascade Db 32 16 73SS + 8 84 — 20 400 —
75 Cascade loading Kb 112 56 26SS + 8, 73, 74 65 — 36 288 —
76 Produce enriched and depleted
material
Cc 24 12 75 600,000 — 54 432 —
56f Gas-diffusion enrichment process (DP)
[finish]
— — — 76,64–66, 58f, 57 — — — — —
77s Aerodynamic enrichment process (AP)
[start] (tasks 78--95)
— 0 0 28 — — — — —
78 Design basic AP enrichment device Fb 48 24 77s 13.2 0.2 36 30 —
79s Acquire research components for AP
[start] (5 ea, tasks 80--81)
— — — 78SS + 12 — — — — —
80 Vortex unit Fa 48 24 79s 2.4 0.25 6 6 —
81 Pumps and piping Ca 24 12 79s 0.6 0.08 — 3 —
79f Acquire research components for AP
[finish]
— — — 80, 81 — — — — —
82 Assemble research devices Cb 24 12 79f 9.6 0.1 18 30 —
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83 Test and evaluate research devices Cb 24 12 82 9.6 0.1 18 30 —
84 Design production devices Db 32 16 83FS–4 8.8 0.07 24 20 —
85 Design enrichment cascade Db 32 16 84SS + 8 12.8 0.07 24 40 —
86 Design of enrichment plant (EP) Eb 40 20 85SS + 8 16 0.08 30 50 —
87 Acquire EP site Ca 24 12 86SS + 4 0.6 2 3 — —
88 Prepare EP site Cc 24 12 87 12.6 0.25 3 30 30
89s Acquire production components for AP
[start] (600 ea, tasks 90--91)
— — — 85SS + 8 — — — — —
90 Vortex unit Fa 48 24 89s 2.4 30 6 6 —
91 Pumps and piping Ia 80 40 89s 1.2 9 — 6 —
89f Acquire production components for AP
[finish]
— — — 90, 91 — — — — —
92 Assemble production devices Fb 48 24 88, 89fFF + 8 126 — 30 600 —
93 Integrate enrichment cascade Db 32 16 92SS + 8 84 — 20 400 —
94 Cascade loading Kb 112 56 26SS + 8, 92, 93 65 — 36 288 —
95 Produce enriched and depleted
material
Cc 24 12 94 900,000 — 54 432 —
77f Aerodynamic enrichment process (AP)
[finish]
— — — 93, 92, 84–86, 79f, 78 — — — — —
27f Enrich uranium [finish] — — — 28, 95 — — — — —
96s Prepare uranium metal [start] (tasks
97--112)
— — — 1s — — — — —
97 Design metal plant (MP) Gb 56 28 96S 19.6 0.12 28 70 —
98 Acquire MP site Ca 24 12 97SS + 12 0.6 0.1 3 — —
99 Prepare MP site Cc 24 12 98 6.6 0.06 3 15 15
100s Acquire metal plant components [start]
(enriched metal, tasks 101--104)
— — — 96s — — — — —
101 Gas-phase reactor with particulate
collection
Fa 48 24 96s 1.8 0.25 6 3 —
102 Hydrogen storage tank Fa 48 24 96s 0.6 0.001 — 3 —
103 Metallurgical furnace Fa 48 24 96s 0.6 0.1 — 3 —
104 Hafnia crucibles Fa 48 24 96s 0.6 0.03 — 3 —
100f Acquire metal plant components,
enriched metal [finish]
— — — 101--104 — — — — —
105s Acquire metal plant components,
depleted metal [start] (tasks 104--109)
— — — 96s — — — — —
106 Gas-phase reactor with particulate
collection
Fa 48 24 105s 0.6 0.25 — 3 —
107 Hydrogen storage tank Fa 48 24 105s 0.6 0.001 — 3 —
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108 Metallurgical furnace Fa 48 24 105s 0.6 0.1 — 3 —
109 Hafnia crucibles Fa 48 24 105s 0.6 0.03 — 3 —
105f Acquire metal plant components,
depleted metal [finish]
— — — 106–109 — — — — —
110 Integrate components Db 32 16 99, 100FF + 12, 105FF
+ 12
20.8 — 24 40 40
111 Produce natural uranium metal Fc 48 24 110 80 0.01 6 18 —
112 Produce depleted/enriched uranium
metal
Cc 24 12 27fFF 160 0.02 12 36 —
96f Prepare uranium metal [finish] — — — 97, 112 — — — — —
113s Prepare nuclear explosive devices [start]
(tasks 114s--196)
— — — 1s — — — — —
114s Design gun device components [start]
(tasks 115--123)
— — — 113s — — — — —
115 Gun Fb 48 24 114s 9.6 0.2 18 30 —
116 Propellant Fb 48 24 114s 3.6 0.03 6 12 —
117s Critical core [start] (tasks 118--121) — — — 114s — — — — —
118 Fissionable receiver Fb 48 24 117s 9.6 0.07 18 30 —
119 Fissionable projectile Fb 48 24 117s 9.6 0.05 18 30 —
120 Tamper Fb 48 24 117s 9.6 0.05 18 30 —
121 Initiator Fb 48 24 117s 1.2 0.01 6 — —
117f Critical core [finish] — — — 118–121 — — — — —
122 Safety and arming devices Fb 48 24 114s 2.4 0.01 6 6 —
123 Fuse Fb 48 24 114s 2.4 0.01 6 6 —
114f Design gun device components [finish] — — — 115, 116, 117f, 122,
123
— — — — —
124 Design weapon assembly plant (AP) Cb 24 12 114f 12 0.07 30 30 —
125 Acquire AP site Ba 16 8 124 0.6 0.8 3 — —
126 Prepare AP site Cc 24 12 125 6.6 0.15 3 15 15
127s Acquire fabrication devices [start] (tasks
128--132)
— — — 114f — — — — —
128 Large-diameter precision lathe Fa 48 24 126FF + 12 2.4 0.1 6 6 —
129 Inert-gas environment precision
milling machine
Fa 48 24 126FF + 12 1.2 0.25 — 6 —
130 Metallurgical furnace Fa 48 24 126FF + 12 1.2 0.25 — 6 —
131 Hafnia crucibles Fa 48 24 126FF + 12 1.2 0.05 — 6 —
132 Inert-gas environment casting system Fa 48 24 126FF + 12 1.2 0.05 — 6 —
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127f Acquire fabrication devices [finish] — — — 128–132 — — — — —
133s Acquire research device components
[start] (natural uranium prototype,
tasks 134--138)
— — — 114 — — — — —
134 High-strength steel cylinder Ca 24 12 133s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
135 Double-base propellant powder Ca 24 12 133s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
136 Polonium Ca 24 12 133s 0.6 0.05 — 3 —
137 Beryllium powder Ca 24 12 133s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
138 Detonator and explosive train
components
Ca 24 12 133s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
133f Acquire research device components
[finish] (natural uranium prototype)
— — — 134–138 — — — — —
139s Fabricate research device components
[start] (natural uranium prototype,
tasks 140--149)
— — — 133f,139s — — — — —
140 Gun barrel Fc 48 24 128, 135, 139s 3.6 — 9 9 —
141 Breech mechanism Fc 48 24 128, 135, 139s 1.8 — — 9 —
142 Cast uranium components Dc 32 16 111, 130, 139s 16 — — 6 —
143 Cast uranium tamper Dc 32 16 111, 130, 139s 16 — — 6 —
144 Machine uranium receiver Dc 32 16 129, 142FF + 8,139s 1.2 — — 6 —
145 Machine uranium projectile Dc 32 16 129, 142FF + 8,139s 1.2 — — 6 —
146 Machine uranium tamper Dc 32 16 129, 142FF + 8,139s 1.2 — — 6 —
147 Initiator Dc 32 16 131, 136, 137, 139s 2.4 — 6 6 —
148 Propellant charge Dc 32 16 132, 135, 139s 1.2 — — 6 —
149 Detonator and explosive train Db 32 16 138, 139s 1.2 — — 6 —
139f Fabricate research device components
[finish]
— — — 140–149 — — — — —
150 Assemble research devices (natural
uranium prototype)
Dc 32 16 133fFF + 4, 139fFF +
4
3.6 — 6 12 —
151s Acquire research device components
[start] (enriched uranium prototype,
tasks 152--157)
— 0 0 172 — — — — —
152 High-strength steel cylinder Ca 24 12 151s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
153 Double-base propellant powder Ca 24 12 151s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
154 Polonium Ca 24 12 151s 0.6 0.05 — 3 —
155 Beryllium powder Ca 24 12 151s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
156 Detonator and explosive train
components
Ca 24 12 151s 0.6 0.01 — 3 —
151f Acquire research device components
[finish]
— — — 152–156 — — — — —
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157s Fabricate research device components,
enriched uranium prototype [start]
(tasks 158--167)
— 0 0 172 — — — — —
158 Gun barrel Cc 24 12 128, 152, 157s 3.6 — 9 9 —
159 Breech mechanism Cc 24 12 128, 129, 157s 1.8 — — 9 —
160 Casting of enriched uranium
components
Ac 8 4 112, 130, 157s 16 — — 6 —
161 Cast depleted uranium tamper Ac 8 4 112, 130, 157s 16 — — 6 —
162 Machine enriched uranium receiver Bc 16 8 129, 160, 157s 1.2 — — 6 —
163 Machine enriched uranium projectile Bc 16 8 129, 160, 157s 1.2 — — 6 —
164 Machine depleted uranium tamper Bc 16 8 129, 161, 157s 1.2 — — 6 —
165 Initiator Ac 8 4 131, 154, 155, 157s 2.4 — 6 6 —
166 Propellant charge Ac 8 4 132, 153, 157s 1.2 — — 6 —
167 Detonator and explosive train Ac 8 4 156, 157s 1.2 — — 6 —
157f Fabricate research device components,
enriched uranium prototype [finish]
— — — 158–167 — — — — —
168 Assemble research devices (enriched
uranium prototype)
Ab 16 8 151FF + 4, 3.6 — 6 12 —
169s Sub-critical testing of research devices
[start] (tasks 170--174)
— — — 170–172 — — — — —
170 Verify critical mass Cb 24 12 170FF + 4 2.4 — 6 6 —
171 Verify gun velocity Cb 24 12 160 3.6 0.1 6 12 —
172 Delivery vehicle compatibility mock-up Cb 24 12 171 3.6 0.1 6 12 —
169f Sub-critical testing of research devices
[finish]
— — — 170, 172 — — — — —
173 Test full-scale device (not required) Fb 48 24 170 80 1 36 360 —
174 Finalize production-weapon design Eb 40 20 170FF + 12 18 0.1 30 60 —
175 Acquire weapon components [start]
(6 weapons; tasks 172--176)
— — — 174SS + 8 — — — — —
176 High-strength steel cylinder Ca 24 12 175s 1.2 0.06 — 6 —
177 Double-base propellant powder Ca 24 12 175s 1.2 0.06 — 6 —
178 Polonium Ca 24 12 175s 1.2 0.3 — 6 —
179 Beryllium powder Ca 24 12 175s 1.2 0.06 — 6 —
180 Detonator and explosive train
components
Ca 24 12 175s 1.2 0.06 — 6 —
175f Acquire weapon components [finish] — — — 176–180 — — — — —
181s Fabricate weapon components [start]
(tasks 182--194)
— — — 174 — — — — —
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182 Gun barrel Cc 24 12 128, 176, 181s 4.8 — 12 12 —
183 Breech mechanism Cc 24 12 128, 129, 181s 2.4 — — 12 —
184 Cast enriched uranium components Cc 24 12 112, 130, 181s 93 — — 12 —
185 Cast depleted uranium tamper Cc 24 12 112, 130 93 — — 12 —
186 Machine enriched uranium receiver Cc 24 12 D 2.4 — — 12 —
187 Machine enriched uranium projectile Cc 24 12 125, 180 2.4 — — 12 —
188 Machine depleted uranium tamper Cc 24 12 129, 185 2.4 — — 12 —
189 Initiator Cc 24 12 131, 178, 179, 181s 4.8 — 12 12 —
190 Propellant charge Cc 24 12 132, 177, 181s 2.4 — — 12 —
191 Detonator and explosive train Cc 24 12 180, 181s 2.4 — — 12 —
192 Fuse Cc 24 12 181s 2.4 — — 12 —
193 Safety and arming device Cc 24 12 181s 2.4 — — 12 —
194 Weapon case and structure Cc 24 12 172, 181s 2.4 — — 12 —
181f Fabricate weapon components [finish] — — — 182–183, 186–194 — — — — —
195 Assemble weapon components Cc 24 12 181f 7.2 0.1 12 24 —
196 Production weapons deliveries — 0 0 195 — — — — —
113f Prepare nuclear explosive devices [finish] — — — 196 — — — — —
1f NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM [finish] — 0 0 113f — — — — —
Source: the authors.
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